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ABSTRACT 
Mutual fund has become an increasingly important investment vehicle for retail investors, 
especially among households. Besides developing the institutional investment as an efficient 
momentum trader, the long-established separation of ownership and control in contemporary 
type of fund management has very much caused depreciation in shareholder value under 
minimum investor protection environment. The unobserved activities and widely magnitude 
decision skills of managers under imperfect contract with the tendency to serve self-interest 
exacerbates the shareholder wealth, predominantly in Shariah mutual fund (SMF), pertaining 
to dual investing interests. This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature with 
central attention given to the existing governance structure, Shariah governance in religious 
based fund, and some other related internal governance mechanisms. Concurrently, the 
review explains theoretically and conceptually the interrelationships among all relevant 
governance mechanisms. After some rigorous discussion and argument, this paper 
recommends further empirical investigation into this line of research to integrate the gap from 
developed market evidence. 
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